

# THE STONE WALL

March 1995

## ARTILLERY At First Bull Run

What role did the artillery play at Bull Run:

"Before the loss of his artillery [McDowell] was the Samson of the field..."

What types of artillery did the armies use:

"...Jackson deployed on the crest at the height... He was in time to secure the Imboden battery before it got off the field, and put it into action. Standard's battery, Pendleton's, and Pelham's, and part of the Washington Artillery were up in time to aid Jackson in his new formation and relieve our discomfited troops rallying on his flank."

What were their capabilities:

"McDowell ... massed Ricketts's and Griffin's batteries, and made their practice grand. So well executed was it that the Confederate left was again in peril..."

*Gen. James Longstreet. From Manassas to Appomattox*

Jim Burgess, the National Park Service historian at Manassas National Battlefield Park since 1980, discusses the artillery's role in First Bull Run.

**JIM BURGESS**

*Thursday March 9, 1995, 7:30 p.m.*

*Manassas National Battlefield Park*

*Visitor Center*

**BULL RUN CIVIL WAR  
ROUND TABLE**

P. O. Box 196  
Centreville, VA 22020

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**UPCOMING TOURS  
Bristoe Station**

Last call. Eleven members have signed up. Three others have volunteered to speak. We've room for more, so sign up at the meeting.

We meet at Dogan Ridge parking lot at 9 a.m. sharp, and will tour in private vehicles, rain or shine.

Bring rations. We want to cover the entire campaign. Any questions, call Armando Mancini, (703) 266-3584.

**Tours of the Blue and Gray Assoc.**

Call (800) 298-1861.

**A Walking Tour of Fredericksburg**, March 30-April 1, Fredericksburg, Va. with Gary W. Gallagher and Robert K. Krick.

**Shiloh: Critical Campaign for the West**, April 6-9, Corinth, Miss. with William Glenn Robertson and others.

**The Last Full Measure: Abraham Lincoln and the End of the Civil War**, April 19-23, Washington D.C. with William C. Davis and others.

**Valley Battlefield Preservation Conference**

**Port Republic and Cross Keys Tour**

The Rappahannock Valley Civil War Round Table hosts its third annual battlefield preservation conference in Fredericksburg March 25-26. This year's theme is "Defend the Valley."

The 1995 Conference on Preserving Virginia's Civil War Heritage will be held at the Fredericksburg Sheraton.

Saturday sessions feature a historical topic and related preservation issues. Topics include Harper's Ferry, Winchester, the 1862 Valley Campaign, and the 1864 Valley Campaign. Speakers include Dr. Joseph Whitehorne, Dr. Brandon Beck, Dennis Frye, Donald C. Pfana, A. Wilson Greene, all well-known to BRCWRT members.

Saturday evening, a social hour begins at 6 p.m., followed by dinner at 7. The guest speaker is John J. Hennessy.

Sunday, historians Robert K. Krick and Gregory C. Mertz lead a bus tour of Port Republic and Cross Keys.

The cost is \$75 for both days including lunches. You can attend the Saturday seminars, the banquet and Sunday tours separately.

For information, call (703) 876-2470. Or see John McAnaw, (703) 978-3371, at the March meeting.

## ROBERT E. LEE AT ANTIETAM

*Should Robert E. Lee have withdrawn from Sharpsburg on the night of Sept. 17, 1862. Gary Ecelbarger and Scott Logan begin a new series by debating Lee's wisdom in remaining on the battlefield.*

### He Should Have Withdrawn

*by Gary Ecelbarger*

On the night of Sept. 17, 1862, Robert E. Lee met his leading subordinate officers at his headquarters near the pike leading from Sharpsburg to the Potomac River. His army of less than 35,000 infantry had suffered tremendously in repulsing an engaged force of the Army of the Potomac that outnumbered them by over 20,000 men. An additional 20,000 Union reinforcements lay in waiting near the banks of Antietam Creek to renew the fight in the morning.

Gen. Lee was in no condition to fight again on Sept. 18. He lost over 10,000 casualties in the battle, leaving him with fewer than 25,000 infantrymen to face off against an opponent that now outnumbered him by greater than 2-to-1. Valuable officers littered his casualty lists. In one instance, a captain led a brigade off the battlefield as there was no higher ranking officer left standing at the end of the day. Only one ford lay in his rear, Boteler's Ford. By crossing the Potomac under the cover of darkness, Lee would be allowed to lick his wounds, reinforce his ranks with the deserters who mysteriously left him during the campaign, and plan another movement and battle.

According to Col. Stephen D. Lee, who claimed to be an eyewitness of the evening council, all of Lee's subordinates recommended crossing the Potomac that night. Longstreet,

looking very depressed, complained that he had little better than a good skirmish line left. D.H. Hill and John Bell Hood complained that their respective divisions were cut to pieces. Even the ever-aggressive Stonewall Jackson told his commander that he'd lost too many valuable division and brigade officers, and also suggested crossing the Potomac before daylight. Despite the unanimous sentiments of his subordinates, Lee ignored their suggestions and told them that they would stay east of the Potomac River and fight again if necessary.

For his decision to stay at Sharpsburg on Sept. 18, 1862, Lee has been praised by most historians for displaying the uncanny ability of judging his opponent, knowing that George McClellan would not fight him. In other words, Lee was playing the ultimate audacious mind game on his opponent.

Although McClellan made Lee look like a genius on Sept. 18, the Confederate commander's judgement should still be questioned.

Robert E. Lee clearly misjudged his opponent on two separate instances during the Antietam Campaign. In his Sept. 3 letter to Jefferson Davis, Lee stated that the Federal armies "are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field." But only two days later, McClellan had 80,000 troops moving into Maryland.

POINT/COUNTERPOINT

Continued from page 9

Lee also did not expect McClellan to fight him continuously for over 12 hours on Sept. 17; for if Lee had expected this, it is inconceivable that he would have permitted the drama of A. P. Hill's timely late afternoon arrival to save the Army of Northern Virginia from destruction.

Lee was clearly not a psychic in these instances. Therefore, it is certainly possible that he could have misjudged his opponent's movements for a third time on Sept. 18.

Rather than accept the advice of his worthy council, Lee disappointed his subordinates and needlessly risked the annihilation of his crippled army. He had no chance of winning a battle on Sept. 18, so he should have said the previous evening, "We will cross the river tonight," rather than the irresponsible remark, "I will give him battle again."

Although the decision resulted in no adverse consequence to the Army of Northern Virginia, it does not diminish the fact that this represented Robert E. Lee's worst lapse of judgment throughout the war.

\* \* \* \* \*

## He Should Have Stayed

*by Scott Logan*

On the 18th of September, 1862, Marse Robert was standing his ground on the Sharpsburg battlefield after having fought the most sanguine one-day battle of the War of Northern Aggression the day before. Despite the opinion of many in the Army of Northern Virginia that it should run while it still had the chance, Lee chose to stay. In the process saved his army to fight another day.

There are many reasons why Lee could have legitimately recrossed the Potomac the night of the 17th. Little Mac had inflicted severe casualties on the Confederate forces (13,724 out of 40,000). Southern forces were disorganized and exhausted. Units were intermingled, and there were 9,000 wounded to be evacuated. The supply trains, in a state of confusion and exacerbated by Union cavalry, caused a problem in ammunition resupply. Finally, McClellan still had several uncommitted corps, and had received another 12,000 troops during the night.

The Confederates had, on the other hand, no major uncommitted forces other than those

around Richmond. While it could be argued that the garrison placed at Harper's Ferry could aid the beleaguered rebels, but this small force was needed to hold open the escape route against building Union pressure from western Virginia. Also, straggling had hurt the army badly before going into Maryland, and hundreds of men were still on the road attempting to catch up (or get away from) their units.

So why did Lee stay?

He stayed because he knew the Little Napoleon was incapable of further combat action. From the time of the Peninsular campaign back in July, Lee had correctly guessed that McClellan's natural caution had turned into an absolute phobia; McClellan wanted to avoid any action that could possibly destroy his army. This fear was confirmed at Malvern Hill, where Little Mac had not taken advantage of his superior numbers to counterattack and seriously cripple the southern host.

Lee also knew that McClellan had little idea of the true shape of the Confederate army. McClellan was essentially a headquarters

POINT/COUNTERPOINT

Continued from page 4

McClellan's pickets and scouts, Lee planted doubt in McClellan's mind.

As usual, McClellan did not undertake a close reconnaissance of the southern lines. Nor did he attempt a systematic scouting of the Confederate rear or lines of communication. In fact, McClellan had already convinced himself that he had done the best he could against overwhelming odds, despite possessing the "Lost Order" which gave him a good idea of the forces he faced.

Lee also surmised that McClellan hated seeing casualties, and what the Union commander had seen on the 17th had been more than enough. Though he loved the planning aspect of command, McClellan had no heart for the fighting.

Finally, there was good logistical reasons for staying. Lee could unscramble his units, evacuate his casualties in an ordered fashion, and bring up the reserve artillery to cover the fords over which the army must cross the Potomac back to Virginia.

Thus Lee could justifiably claim Sharpsburg a tactical victory; he held the field. By staying on the field on the 18th, the Army of Northern Virginia had the time to withdraw unhindered and in good order. As I have argued, Lee knew that McClellan had no more fight. By showing of a bold face in front of Sharpsburg, Lee saved his army.

NEWS FROM THE ASSOC.  
FOR THE PRESERVATION OF  
CIVIL WAR SITES

The Winter 1994 issue of the association's *Hallowed Ground* included several items of interest.

\* A. Wilson Greene left his position as APCWS President, to become Executive Director of Pamplin Park Civil War Site near Petersburg. Greene stated that this location "will be the nation's premier private Civil War historical park."

\* The interim APCWS President is Dennis Fry.

\* T. Jeff Driscoll has been appointed Director of Programs and Properties.

\* Recent land acquisitions include options on 98 acres (Glendal Homes); 110 acres (James River Lumber Tract); and donation of a five-acre easement on the site of Fort Hood, the only Confederate fort built to guard the Rappahannock River.

\* The APCWS was on the verge of acquiring more than 700 acres at Brice's Cross Roads.

\* The major APCWS achievement of 1994 was the "Campaign to Save Malvern Hill and Glendale." This was the largest private-sector fundraising effort ever initiated to preserve Civil War battlefields. Almost \$900,000 has been raised, allowing APCWS to take title to 735 acres. Another \$1.4 million is needed to retire the debt, but the *Hallowed Ground* noted the APCWS is well ahead of their projected pace.

\* The annual APCWS meeting is May 5-7 in Tupelo, Miss. Speakers include well-known writers and historians. Tours of Brice's Cross Roads, Corinth, Tupelo and Shiloh are offered. For information, contact APCWS, Inc., P.O. Box 1862, Fredericksburg, Va., 22402, (703) 371-1860.

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1995 DUES FORM

Membership categories (circle one)

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PERMISSION TO SPEAK FREELY

## A SUPERB FIGHTING UNIT: THE IRISH BRIGADE

*By John McAnaw*

*This is written in response to Gary Ecelbarger's article "Most Overrated Brigade: The Irish Brigade" in the February issue of The Stone Wall.*

Professional football fans probably remember Conrad Dobler, the All-Pro offensive lineman for the old St. Louis Cardinals. Dobler had the knack of infuriating opponents with physical and verbal abuse, thus drawing the desired response: a penalty for the other team.

Well I believe that Gary Ecelbarger is a wee bit like ol' Conrad. He knew full well that by taking down the Irish Brigade as a Most Overrated Brigade, he would draw a response from me.

In a nutshell, Mr. Ecelbarger stated the Irish Brigade failed, unlike the "best brigades," to turn defeat into victory. He cited the Irish Brigade as failing at Antietam, Fredericksburg and Gettysburg. Therefore, he feels the Brigade does not deserve to be mentioned in the same breath as the Iron Brigade or Hood's Texas Brigade.

I, on the other hand, believe the Irish Brigade's record speaks for itself. The Irishmen performed superbly even under extremely adverse circumstances. Its regiments lost more than 4,000 killed and wounded, although it probably never fielded as many as 2,700-2,800 combat effectives at any one time.

The integral components of the Irish Brigade are the 63rd N.Y., 69th N.Y., 88th N.Y., 28 Mass. and 116 Pa. All five made Lt. Col. William F. Fox's famous list of "Fighting Three Hundred" in his 1888 book *Regimental Losses in the Civil War*, which covers the Union regiments that suffered the most combat losses during the war.

With very few exceptions, each regiment lost over 130 killed/mortally wounded. You may comment, like Mr. Ecelbarger, that high losses do not necessarily reflect combat proficiency.

Civil War buffs know many brigades and regiments, such as Stannard's Vermont Brigade at Gettysburg, inflicted heavy losses on their adversaries while suffering negligible losses themselves. Fox's response to these examples is worth remembering: "Granted, as

regards some particular action or instance; but, in the long run, active service brings its many scars; where the musketry was the hottest, the dead lay thickest; and there is no better way to find the fighting regiments than to follow the bloody trail which marked their brave advance."

The 2nd (Irish) Brigade served in the 1st Division of 2nd Corps, Army of the Potomac. The 1st Division lost more killed and wounded in combat than any other division in the Union Army.

Until whittled down by casualties and enlistment expirations in the 1864 campaign against Richmond and Petersburg, Hancock's old division was the premier offensive force in the Army of the Potomac. The heart of this shock force was the 2nd (Irish) Brigade. Survivors of the Irish Brigade pointed out with pride that during the war they captured over 20 stands of colors, and never lost a flag themselves.

### THE 1862 PENINSULA CAMPAIGN

Regarding Ecelbarger's statement that the Irish Brigade failed to turn defeat into victory, consider its performance during the 1862 Peninsula Campaign.

On June 1, 1862, the second day of the Battle of Seven Pines (Fair Oaks), Brig. Gen. Meagher's Irish Brigade, along with the other two brigades of Maj. Gen. Richardson's 1st Division, repulsed attacks by Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill's forces. The 29th Mass. Volunteer Regt., not the 28th Mass., was assigned to the Irish Brigade.

At Savage Station June 29. and again at White Oak Swamp June 30, the Irish Brigade and other elements of 2nd and 3rd Corps repulsed attacks designed to catch the Army of Potomac as it shifted bases from White House to Harrison's Landing.

At Malvern Hill on July 1, the brigade rushed to Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter's 5th Corps assistance, and after prolonged close combat, the Confederate attack against the Union left flank was stopped. Brigade

## IRISH

Continued from page 6

losses were heavy; the 69th N.Y., for example, lost over 150.

During the Peninsula Campaign, the Irish Brigade won the praise of Maj. Gen. McClellan, Maj. Gen. Sumner, Maj. Gen. Porter and other senior Union leaders. It had justifiably earned a reputation as an aggressive and reliable unit that performed well even under the most difficult circumstances. It was considered the Army's "Fire Brigade" and one of its premier units. When 2nd Corps went into combat, Sumner would ask, "Are my Green Flags ready?"

I believe it is fair to state that the Irish Brigade made a significant contribution by its steadfast conduct under heavy enemy pressure and prevented disaster as the Army of Potomac shifted its base to Harrison's Landing.

### SHARPSBURG/ANTIETAM

Mr. Ecelbarger cited the Irish Brigade's failure to carry the Sunken Road, or Bloody Lane, at Sharpsburg (Antietam). To the contrary, first-hand accounts of the battle for Bloody Lane indicate that the brigade was materially responsible in driving the Confederate defenders from that stronghold.

The 1st Division began its assault on Bloody Lane around 10-10:15 a.m. with the Irish Brigade the first to attack. The brigade arrived in the nick of time; Maj. Gen. French's hard-pressed division had begun to fall apart under the rifle fire from the Sunken Road. Brig. Gen. Kimball's brigade's left flank regiment, the 7th W.Va. was being flanked by Col. Posey's Mississippi Confederate Brigade.

The Irish Brigade caught Posey's men in the open and devastated them. The Irishmen got to within 50 yards of the Confederate line when in turn, they received a volley that cut down most of the front rank, and dropped every regimental color bearer. Yet the Brigade stood firm and sprayed buck and ball into the densely packed Confederates. Their fire was so deadly that Confederate reinforcements were unable to move forward to help.

For more than one-and-a-half hours, Meagher's request for help went unheeded and the Irish Brigade fought alone.

After expending their ammunition, the Brigade's surviving members executed a right wheel and, dis-

dainful of the enemy, moved to the rear in columns of four to replenish their ammunition.

Soon after, Brig. Gen. Caldwell's brigade punched through about 12-12:30 p.m. and enfiladed the Confederates. Members of Caldwell's brigade commented that their success was due, in large part, to the Irishmen causing severe casualties among the Confederates without help from the other brigades.

The Battle of Sharpsburg was devastating to the Irish Brigade. Many of its well-trained officers and NCOs were killed or wounded. And of the 960 combat effectives of the 63rd, 69th and 88th N.Y. Regts., 500 were dead and wounded. Only the reserve regiment, the 29th Mass., with 39, suffered light losses.

I have covered this battle in some detail to show that the Irish Brigade performed exceedingly well and was in large part responsible for preventing the collapse of French's division, including Brig. Gen. Kimball's Brigade; and crushing the Confederate center at Bloody Lane. If the Irish Brigade had been properly supported, the Confederates would have been driven out of Bloody Lane by 11-11:15 a.m.

Also to their credit, after replenishing their ammunition, what was left of the Irish Brigade returned to the Sunken Road, while other brigades engaged earlier in the day, did not.

At Sunken Road, the Irish Brigade, aided to be sure by other units, did materially contribute in turning a costly repulse into a local victory. What more should one expect of this hard-fighting unit. To be blunt, the Irish Brigade successfully accomplished its mission at Sharpsburg.

### FREDERICKSBURG

Mr. Ecelbarger claimed the Irish Brigade accomplished nothing at Fredericksburg, Dec. 31, 1862, other than losing 545 of its 1,250 men in the attempt to storm Marye's Heights.

I do not believe that any other brigade in 2nd Corps made as determined an attempt against the Confederate position. The valor of the Irishmen was attested by numerous eyewitnesses.

As I read of the abortive 2nd Corps attacks, the words of King Leonidas, speaking for the 300 dead Spartans at Thermopylae in 480 B.C., come to mind: "Go, tell the Spartans, thou that passest by, that here, obedient to their laws we lie." The Irish Brigade was

## IRISH

Continued from page 7

virtually destroyed by the grossly incompetent senior leadership at Fredericksburg.

## GETTYSBURG

The Irish Brigade, with 532 men, is criticized for not holding the Wheatfield, late afternoon July 2, 1863 at Gettysburg. The Brigade, led by Col. Patrick Kelly, fought very well. Not even Maj. Gen. John C. Caldwell's 1st Division, 2nd Corps, including the Irish Brigade plus other units of 2nd and 5th Corps, could hold the Wheatfield and surrounding terrain. Why then single out an undersized brigade for criticism.

Caldwell's 1st Division was rushed into combat by Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock about 5:15 p.m. to save 3rd Corps from destruction. At 5:30 McLaw's division of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's Corps launched an attack that cracked 3rd Corps vicinity the Peach Orchard, and threatened Caldwell's right (west) flank.

The Irish Brigade, despite heavy resistance, had swept through the Wheatfield and into the wooded high ground to the southwest, but had no choice but to fall back with the other brigades. Thus its hard fighting came to naught. However, it helped buy time for Maj. Gen. Gordon G. Meade to stabilize the Union front by late evening along the Cemetery Ridge line.

## BACKGROUND

The Irish Brigade was in many ways a unique volunteer unit. Unlike the vast majority of Union volunteer regiments, many of its officers and enlisted men had prior military experience. For example, one third of the members of the 88th N.Y. had served in the British Army. Others served in the army of the Papal States.

The brigade was blessed with talented engineering and medical personnel. Its entrenchments dug during the 1864 Overland Campaign were the best prepared by any unit in the Army of the Potomac.

Concern for field sanitation and individual health and welfare is reflected by the fact that for every member of the Irish Brigade who died due to disease or accident, two died of battle wounds. During the war, the ratio of soldiers who died of disease or accident compared to those who died in action was two to one, the reverse of Irish Brigade.

The Irish Brigade also had another dimension: religious and ethnic homogeneity. The vast majority of its

members were practicing Roman Catholics, of Irish birth or of Irish descent.

The conduct of Irish Brigade members toward Southern soldiers and civilians was generally excellent.

Also the Brigade's members had something to prove to the American public: namely their allegiance to their adopted country, and that they were, in fact, capable soldiers.

Their actions were convincing.

## CONCLUSION

The Brigade maintained its identity for the remainder of the war; no mean feat. Even certain "top-notch" brigades failed to last until the war's end. Like the legendary phoenix, the Irish Brigade rebuilt itself numerically and, under the legendary Col. Thomas A. Smyth, fought well in the Wilderness and at Spotsylvania Court House. At Cold Harbor, it and other 1st Division units suffered severe losses in assaults against the well-entrenched Confederates. Of note, the only breach in the Confederates' line was made by the 1st Division.

Many factors enter the equation regarding any attempt to pick out top-notch combat units. Some have been addressed. As infantry veterans will tell you, if a unit is in the wrong place at the wrong time, it will suffer severely, no matter how well lead or trained. Units such as the Irish Brigade had no control over where they were deployed, or in picking the senior leaders who issued the orders that affected them. The Brigade had to do the best with the hand it was dealt.

Also infantrymen know that success in battle is rarely due to the action of a single unit. Victory comes with teamwork and the competent support from other combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

To attempt to rate a unit, one must study it over the long haul. Three and one half years, the life of the Irish Brigade, is a long haul. Every unit has its ups and downs. But how many units experienced the losses of trained manpower to the degree the Irish Brigade suffered and yet maintain its identity and combativeness.

Can there be any doubt that the Irish Brigade ranks with the finest fighting units in the Union Army. I do not think so.



FROM THE RANKS

## Letter from Prison

*Letter from James Langhorne, Adjutant, 4th Virginia, Stonewall Brigade, to his parents. In possession of Gary Ecelbarger, Sterling, Va.*

Ft. Delaware, Room No. 1, April 3d, 1862

The commandant of this Fort has kindly consented for the prisoners confined here with me to write and relieve the anxiety of their friends and relations at home, and to give the circumstances of their capture.

I was taken prisoner just at dark near Winchester on the evening of the 23d of March, and nearly every man here was taken at the same time and place with myself. The minute circumstance of my capture are as follows:

Our Regiment was ordered to engage the enemy on our extreme left. Our line of battle extended over a hill, the side of which descended very abruptly. The crest of the hill prevented our seeing the right fall back. The order was not reported on the extreme left, and the men continued to fight on until the enemy in large numbers came to the crest of the hill and commenced a heavy fire right down our line, having almost turned our flank on the right. The Captains then saw that if they did not immediately order their men to fall back they would be surrounded. We retired in very good order over a hill thinly wooded immediately on the other side of which, and at the base, was a stone fence, and just over said fence, a very level field. Here the officers ordered the men to halt and form a square against cavalry, as we perceived we were only pursued in the direction we retired, by cavalry. I took the colors from the ensign of our Regiment and rallied upon the 4th to rally around them. Col. Fulkerson, telling them they had only to resist cavalry, and would do that with the bayonet - all the men with few exceptions having shot away their ammunition. The men, although there were not ten from one company, formed two sides of the square as quietly and coolly as they could if no enemy had been charging upon them. Just at this moment, two very large Regiments of the enemy appeared on the crest of a modest elevation not 50 yards on our right, and drew up with our right flank, and poured a full volley into us.

Colonel Fulkerson immediately saw our hazardous situation, and ordered both men and officers to make as fast as they could to a copse of wood on the right. The men saw their danger, and everyone ran with all the strength he had in him after marching 43 miles since the morning before, and fought from two o'clock until twilight. But the enemy cavalry knew the positions and designs of the infantry on our right, anticipating that when we discovered the infantry on our right we would make for the woods on the left, and sent the larger squadrons to us to cut off this means of escape. Col. Fulkerson and myself being wounded, rode at an easy gallop so as to be able to make the circle of the left wing of the enemy's infantry and keep out of the range of the cavalry pursuing.

FROM THE RANKS

Continued from page 9

Col. Fulkerson remarked to me, as I still held the flag of the Regiment in my hand, that he thought with the mare I was riding that I could save the colors with ease. Just here the lane turned off at right angles to the right and just at this place, young Durham of the "Pulaski Guards" and Capt. Wright of the "Dare Devils" asked me to let them have my mare that they thought they could make their escape on her. I asked them if they were too badly wounded to save the colors - Durham said he had only a slight wound through the right shoulder and could save himself on foot but for having been broken down by the marches and knew, with my mare, could save both Wright and himself. So I got down and helped them on my mare and I gave Durham the colors, telling him to tear them up if he thought there was a danger of their being captured. I took "Annie" by the bridle, drew her back from the fence, and struck her on the side with my hand saying, "Go over Annie." She cleared the fence beautifully with both of them on her back.

I jumped over the fence and started as fast as I could across the field, but before I got 50 yards the cavalry had got to the fence I had just left and I knew would shoot me in my back, so I drew my pistol and turned and fired at the front cavalry man. He threw both hands to his chest but I did not see him fall from his horse. The next man that came over the fence was a Lieutenant. As he advanced my pistol misfired or I would have killed him. He rode right up to me and asked me if I was a "sesech." I told him "No, confound you, but I am a rebel." He then said "You are my prisoner, surrender." I told him I would see him d--d first and struck high guard and thrust with all my might at his abdomen. But that old sword failed in the first effort and did not get through his clothes. To show you how cool the Lieutenant was, as I thrust at him he drew his second pistol and shot me in the side. I thought it was a mortal wound as it knocked me down...

I was taken to Winchester, then to Baltimore on the 25th and confined in the city jail. We arrived at this place the morning of the 30th. We have been kindly treated since we got here by all the officers. I am a jail bird now, but a happy one, for I feel that I have done my duty. Love to every one black and white.

**Bull Run Civil War Round Table**

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